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Abstract—At IEEE S&P 2019, the paper “DEEPSEC: A Uni-
form Platform for Security Analysis of Deep Learning Model” aims
to to “systematically evaluate the existing adversarial attack and
defense methods.” While the paper’s goals are laudable, it fails to
achieve them and presents results that are fundamentally flawed
and misleading. We explain the flaws in the DEEPSEC work,
along with how its analysis fails to meaningfully evaluate the
various attacks and defenses. Specifically, DEEPSEC (1) evaluates
each defense obliviously, using attacks crafted against undefended
models; (2) evaluates attacks and defenses using incorrect im-
plementations that greatly under-estimate their effectiveness; (3)
evaluates the robustness of each defense as an average, not based
on the most effective attack against that defense; (4) performs
several statistical analyses incorrectly and fails to report variance;
and, (5) as a result of these errors draws invalid conclusions and
makes sweeping generalizations.
I. INTRODUCTION
DEEPSEC is a platform to “measure the vulnerability of
[deep learning] models” and “conduct comparative studies
on attacks/defenses” [6]. Ling et al. re-implemented many
common attacks and defenses to fit the consistent interface
of DEEPSEC and then “systematically evaluate the existing
adversarial attack and defense methods” [6].
Unfortunately, DEEPSEC’s attack and defense re-
implementations, experimental design, and analysis results are
fundamentally flawed such that the obtained results greatly
misrepresent the effectiveness of both attacks and defenses.
Here, we summarize the ways in which the DEEPSEC paper
errs in its implementation and analysis.
II. SUMMARY OF ERRORS
Evaluation uses attacks that are oblivious to defenses. A
security defense can only be meaningfully evaluated by mea-
suring the effectiveness of attacks crafted against it. For
example, RC2-aware attacks can assess the strength of RC2
encryption, but using the exact linear characteristic that breaks
DES to assess the strength of RC2 would be meaningless.
In DEEPSEC, the effectiveness of defenses is measured by
crafting attacks on an undefended model and replaying those
attacks on the defended models, which undermines the stated
purpose of its security evaluation.
It might be of some interest whether attacks transfer from
undefended to defended models, however this is not what
the DEEPSEC paper claims to present. The paper claims to
measure “non-adaptive and white-box” robustness of defenses;
such “white-box” attack evaluations must still be run (possibly
unmodified) given direct access to each defense [3]. In short,
DEEPSEC in effect performs a non-adaptive, black-box, zero-
query, and transfer-only attack analysis.
Defenses are evaluated by average (not minimum) efficacy.
A key factor differentiating security (and adversarial robust-
ness) from general forms of fault tolerance is the requirement
for worst-case analysis. Instead, DEEPSEC uses averages to
assess the effectiveness of different attacks and defenses.
For example, in Table V, DEEPSEC bolds the column for the
NAT defense when evaluated on CIFAR-10 because it gives the
highest “average security” against all attacks. However, this is
fundamentally the wrong evaluation: actual attacks have found
that NAT has a strictly lower accuracy [1] under all distortion
metrics than the alternate approach of Madry et al. [7].
Multiple attacks are implemented incorrectly. Table XIV in
DEEPSEC reports an attack misclassification rate substantially
lower than in prior work. For example, on MNIST with a
ℓ∞ distortion bound of ε = 0.3, DEEPSEC reports the attack
success rate of FGSM [4] is 30.4%. Our re-implementation of
FGSM reaches a 66% success rate on their model [2].
DEEPSEC also reports a 76% success rate with JSMA [9] for
γ = 0.1. However, this attack reaches a 95% success rate when
using the official implementation in CleverHans [8]. Further,
the reported attack success rates at ε = 0.3 for BIM [5] is
75.6% and PGD is 82.4%, contradicting the 100% success
rate reported in the relevant prior work [7].
The PGD defense is implemented incorrectly. While its
underlying idea is simple—repeatedly generate and train on
adversarial examples—PGD adversarial training (PAT) is very
difficult to get right in practice. The authors claim to evaluate
the approach of Madry et al. [7] but make at least three errors:
• Incorrect loss function. PAT should train only on adver-
sarial examples, but DEEPSEC also uses clean data.
• Incorrect model architectures. PAT specifies large model
capacity is required, but DEEPSEC uses a small model.
• Incorrect hyperparameter settings. PAT should train for
83 epochs to converge, but DEEPSEC trains for only 20.
Possibly because of these implementation differences,
DEEPSEC incorrectly concludes that a weak form of adversar-
ial training [4] performs better than PGD adversarial training,
contradicting prior results [1, 7].
No error bars for any results. The DEEPSEC paper does
not include any information about the variance of its analysis
results. When we run the authors’ FGSM attack implemen-
tation 16 times we observe an attack success rate that is
approximately normal with a mean of 32.7% and standard
deviation of 6.8%. Such high variance would make many pair-
wise comparisons in Table XIV not be statistically significant.
Analysis computes averages over different threat models.
The DEEPSEC report computes the mean over different threat
models, which gives a number that is completely uninforma-
tive. When DEEPSEC reports 60% robustness for a defense,
this means the following: first, the adversary chooses a random
threat model with a certain probability (ℓ∞: 50%, ℓ0: 5%, and
ℓ2: 45% of the time); then, the adversary chooses a random
attack from those studied with that threat model; then, for that
chosen attack, the attacker will fail 60% of the time. Of course,
no attacker would follow this protocol, and therefore, this this
across-threat-model average is not informative.
The permitted distortion (ε) is too large to be meaningful.
The purpose of an ℓp distortion bound is to ensure the true
label can not change [3, 4]. The DEEPSEC paper studies a
CIFAR-10 ℓ∞ distortion of ε = 0.1 and ε = 0.2, which is 3×
(or 6×) larger than what is typically studied [1, 7].
The paper further studies ℓ∞ distortion bounds as high as
0.6 in Table VII, and 0.5 in Table XIV and XV. These extreme
distortions would allow any image to be converted to solid
grey, and (for 0.6) past that to a low-contrast version of any
other image, contradicting the purpose of ℓp threat models.
Attacks and defenses evaluated ignoring threat model.
Both attacks and defenses are typically designed to target a
specific set of threat models. All of the attacks considered
were designed to minimize exactly one specific distortion
metric; DEEPSEC, however, evaluates all attacks on every
metric without optimize the attack for each metric.
Even more concerning, the majority of the defenses studied
contain explicit threat models explicitly scoping their contri-
butions to limited attack models (e.g., PAT is only designed
to be robust to ℓ∞ attacks with ε < 0.031 on CIFAR-10 [7]).
DEEPSEC performs unfair defense evaluations by violating the
threat model of every defense which contains one (e.g., by
evaluating PAT against ℓ0 and ℓ1 attacks). When defenses are
evaluated under different threat models than originally stated,
this fact should be stated explicitly.
Incorrect experimental design for comparing attacks. The
numbers presented in Table V do not make it possible to
compare how well different attacks perform on defended
models. While ILLC is a much stronger attack than LLC (as
shown in the original paper [5]), the DEEPSEC report makes
it appear that LLC is a better attack against defended models.
This is due to flawed experimental design: DEEPSEC does not
evaluate defenses on all the relevant examples, but only on
those that fool the baseline model. Therefore, the 39% attack
success rate of LLC against PAT is computed from only 134 of
the 1000 possible attack samples; in contrast, ILLC’s 16.3%
success rate is computed from all of the 1000 samples. These
numbers are fundamentally incomparable.
Anomalies due to incorrect experimental design. When
given strictly more power, the adversary should never do
worse. However, Table VII reports that an MNIST attacker
is less likely to succeed with large permitted ℓ∞ perturbation
of at most 0.6 compared to the smaller budget of at most 0.2.
Sweeping and false conclusions. In multiple places, the
DEEPSEC paper states all defenses are “more or less” effec-
tive [6], which is false. Most of the defenses studied offer
0% robustness to any of the currently-known state-of-the-art
white-box or black-box attacks [1]. Instead, all of the paper’s
conclusions should be restricted to non-adaptive, black-box,
zero-query, and transfer-only adversarial examples.
III. CONCLUSION
Improperly-performed experiments are worse than experi-
ments not performed when published as authoritative results.
Because survey papers have significant influence on the un-
derstanding of the academic community, researchers that craft
such papers should take great care to ensure the accuracy of all
their results and not introduce misinformation. Unfortunately,
the analysis of DEEPSEC [6] falls below this bar due to
fundamental flaws in its experimental design and evaluation.
Researchers who set out to reproduce prior work must
hold themselves to an exceptionally high standard. Of the
4 attacks and 1 defense implementations in DEEPSEC that
we studied, all had at least one significant flaw. Clean-room
re-implementations can be extremely valuable to ensure cor-
rectness of reported results; however, after reproducing prior
work, it is critical to compare to existing implementations.
For all of these attacks and defenses, correct and open-source
implementations already exist in CleverHans [8] but these
were not used or compared against by the DEEPSEC authors.
Future work should not follow the evaluation approach taken
by the DEEPSEC paper. The DEEPSEC framework itself should
not be used to evaluate defenses until all remaining attacks and
defenses are confirmed to be correct. The analysis results of
Tables V, VI, and VII should be disregarded except insofar as
they analyze the transferability of adversarial examples. The
sweeping general conclusions should be ignored.
We refer the interested reader to [3] for a longer discussion
of common flaws, and recommendations for how they can be
best avoided, when evaluating adversarial robustness.
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